C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2001.
Written originally as radio addresses in 1942 through 1944, Mere Christianity is the product of years of thoughtful work on the part of C.S. Lewis. As Kathleen Norris points out in her “Foreword”: “[t]his book, then, does not consist of academic philosophical musings. Rather, it is a work or oral literature, addressed to people at war” (xvii). It is intended to be imminently practical; Mere Christianity is a book for the average Christian, though it brings the experienced theologian back to the roots of their faith in Christ. Lewis divides his work into four books, laying out a conceptual direction for the reader. Book 1 tackles the basic spirituality of humanity, without moving directly into Christianity at first. He starts with the premise of a natural law that all people know, and that no matter what they try they cannot seem to keep within this law’s boundaries (8). Lewis tactfully demonstrates the probability of the Natural Law, and then uses this to launch into an essential defense of Christianity (28-32). Though the approach assumes much, it is foundationally sound as Lewis ends the first section.
Book 2 transitions from the basic concept of right behavior to the specific realm of what Christians have historically believed. As he does in other works like Miracles and The Abolition of Man, Lewis hangs his expression of Christianity on the Incarnation as the central tenet (55). Christ’s sacrifice asserts itself as the answer to all the questions previously raised in Book 1, demonstrating that Christianity is best equipped to handle humankind in its present state. While he is aware that this will not satisfy every skeptic, Lewis asserts that things taken on authority are the in actuality the normal mode of believing (62). His examples are cogent, and rightly demonstrate that demanding personal, empirical data on all things is a silly notion that will never be fulfilled. To possess knowledge is to trust in authority.
From there, Lewis explores Christian ethics. Book 3, entitled “Christian Behaviour,” is where the rubber meets the road, so to speak. Ethics in this regard are to be considered in light of the immortality of the soul, recognizing that not even an empire is more important when compared to the everlasting spirit of the individual (74-75). Lewis then explores the seven virtues: the Cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude) and the Theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) (76, 129). Lewis follows his tripartite breakdown of relationships related to ethics, initially concentrating on the man and man aspect. Vital to his explanation is the idea that Christianity is not a culture per se, but rather something for all cultures in all times (82-83). In Book 4, Lewis sharpens his argument to be more than a general prescription of faith, to the specific manifestation of God found in Christianity.
One of the most common accusations about “simple” Christianity is that it is devoid of the distinctives which denominations their impetus. The charge typically implies that there should be no unique expressions of Christianity, but rather some kind of minimalist faith based on the words “in red.” Lewis’s classic work might be seen in this light, but this would be to misread him. As he states at the outset, “I hope no reader will suppose that ‘mere’ Christianity is here put forward as an alternative to the creeds of the existing communions–as if a man could adopt it in preference to Congregationalism or Greek Orthodoxy…it is more like a hall out of which doors open into several rooms” (xv). Lewis is not interested in a kind of “Ecumenical Babel,” but rather is identifying the essentials of faith so that people might all the better follow God’s leading into a particular expression of the faith. Without this foundational idea, Lewis’s work would fall flat. Nevertheless, it is this desire for the robust, whilst only presenting the essential that imbues Mere Christianity with the powerful imagination that emerges throughout.
This kind of pragmatic, humble perspective is highlighted throughout, often formulated into quotes that make their way onto t-shirts and Instagram pictures. While such pop culture icons can be a sign of shallow engagement, this is not necessarily the case. This is because aside from “explaining” Christianity, Lewis is also a prominent assessor of culture, bordering on the prophetic. His words reverberate beyond the pages of his book to demonstrate how right he was that “progress means getting nearer to the place where you want to be . . . [so] the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive man” (28). Mere Christianity embodies this sort of common sense, endearing people to Lewis and his faith simultaneously.
Perhaps his weakest section is the “The Rival Conceptions of God.” He presents a simplistic response to the problem of evil in Chapter 5, relying the moral law to explain the very notion of good or evil (38). It is not weak in the sense that his arguments are invalid, but rather they run into the problem of postmodern contingency and communal morality. How would Lewis have responded to Rorty or Brandom given the opportunity?1 I do not know, but I do think the arguments they put forth pose the greatest challenge to Lewis’s natural law theory. However, it is difficult to find genuine challenges beyond this. Lewis wrote with precision and clarity, so much so that Mere Christianity stands as one of the best books ever written as a kind of cultural apologetic.
Most thoroughly expressed in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) and in Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). Though I think both concepts fall short on their own accord, I do think they possess powerful culture influence that Lewis’s argument would need to engage with were Mere Christianity written in the 21st century.