What Exactly is the Problem of Evil?

Alvin Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil: A Book Review

Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989.

Alvin Plantinga was born in Michigan in 1932. After some prodding by his father Cornelius Plantinga, Alvin enrolled at Jamestown College in 1949, and the following year the younger Plantinga followed his father to Calvin College in Grand Rapids. Initially, Plantinga went back and forth between Calvin and Harvard until a series of lectures by William Harry Jellema convinced young Plantinga that Calvin was where he needed to be. It was there that Plantinga studied philosophy, often from a historical foundation.¹ He would go on to complete his PhD studies at Yale University in 1958.² Over the past five decades, Plantinga has published works on the academic and popular levels, firmly establishing himself as a force to be reckoned with in the realm of Christianity and that of philosophy as well. He has covered a wide range of topics in the philosophical world, from his landmark assessment of the problem of evil in 1974 to Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism in 2011. He has lectured around the world to a variety of audiences, and has garnered the respect of the Christian community, as well as that of those outside the walls of the Church.

God, Freedom, and Evil is, in its most basic summary, a defense of the rationality of theism. While belief that God exists has been a subject of debate for centuries, Plantinga asserts that any claim that such belief is irrational is incorrect (11). David Hume’s classic formulation of the problem of evil makes the claim that belief in an all-good, omnipotent God must be nonsense considering the immense suffering in this world. But as Plantinga demonstrates, there is no reason to accept such a statement as true. For Plantinga, the atheist must do more to assert such a claim (11). In painstaking detail, Plantinga engages J. L Mackie on this topic. Plantinga distinguishes between the intellectual problem of evil and pastoral problem of evil, of which the former is the subject he is prepared to deal with in his book (28-29).³

The bulk of the book is dedicated to exploring the problem of evil in its various logical out workings. Lingering on the topic of Mackie’s iteration of the problem of evil, Plantinga demonstrates that for the theist to accept the logical claim,

1) God is omnipotent,
2) God is wholly good,
3) There is evil in the world, therefore, God does not exist

there is quite a bit that needs to be unpacked (13). Plantinga illustrates how this formulation of the problem hinges on implications that are not necessarily true. Through his exploration of the concept of possible worlds, Plantinga elucidates just how it is consistent for the theist to maintain that God can be omnipotent and there still be evil in the world (25-27). This argument hangs upon his Free Will Defense (29-34). In essence, the Free Will Defense is a logical solution to the question of evil without delving into the realm of attempting to understand God’s mind. No reasons for evil are provided, rather, Plantinga shows that in all possible worlds, it is quite possible that the actual world is the best creatable option. The lynchpin in the counter argument relies on the idea of transworld depravity (i.e. that given a different set of circumstances, a person who did something wicked might not do such a thing, thus yielding a better possible world). Plantinga illustrates the error of this thought,

Obviously, it is possible that there be persons who suffer from transworld depravity. More generally, it is possible that everybody suffers from it. And if this possibility were actual, then God, though omnipotent, could not have created any of the possible worlds containing just the persons who do in fact exist, and containing moral good but no moral evil. (48)

Thus, the Free Will Defense is vindicated before its critics, demonstrating that there is nothing logically inconsistent regarding the Christian theist beliefs about God and the presence of evil in the world (64).

From there, Plantinga deals briefly with a couple of other atheological claims, before moving into the second point of his book. In defending natural theology, Plantinga argues that the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God are insufficient. Instead, he claims, Anselm’s formulation of the ontological argument provides the best way to understand how God can be a necessarily contingent being. “But if a proposition is impossible in at least one possible world, then it is impossible in every possible world; what is impossible does not vary from world to world” (112). For Plantinga, Anselm’s claim that God is the greatest of all possible beings must be true in each instance, and it is necessarily true in the actual world as well. Plantinga acknowledges that such an argument will not convert anyone to theism, but it is enough, he claims, to demonstrate that the accusation that theism is nonsense is overstated, to say the least. For Plantinga, nothing is more rational than belief in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent, and the Creator of all free beings.

I have tried to put that I have to say in a way that is philosophically accurate and responsible; but I have tried especially hard to put it as clearly and simply as the subjects allows. (4)

Alvin Plantinga, 2009

It is important to note that Plantinga is not engaged in apologetics; at least, he is not engaged in an apologetic project the way Christians normally think of apologetics. Plantinga is out to convince no one of his perspective. In fact, when all his efforts are concluded, he reminds his reader, “that it establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability” (112). In a sense, Plantinga is strictly engaged in what we find enunciated via 1 Peter 3:15: “sanctify Christ as Lord in your hearts, always being ready to make a defense to everyone who asks you to give an account for the hope that is in you, yet with gentleness and reverence” (NAS95). Plantinga is offering to help Christians be ready to defend the rationality of theism: nothing more, nothing less. It is not a systematic theology which details every possible scenario imagined nor is it a course in dismantling the arguments of atheists. God, Freedom, and Evil is an effort to remind Christians to hold their heads high, having confidence that their faith is a reasonable one. To this end, Plantinga is gentle and reverent, making no enemies in his work whilst still being candid. Few people can tell a person they are wrong, and walk away feeling enlightened, and yet Plantinga creates just such an effect.

Despite Plantinga’s claims, God, Freedom, and Evil remains a difficult work for many. Barely reaching the length of the average novella, it is a dense work in terms of level. For Plantinga, this may be as simple as it gets, but for the average reader, it may still be daunting. Still, in light of the complexity of the philosophical issue at hand, Plantinga’s little book is an accessible survey of the world of the philosophy of religion.

In terms of providing a convincing argument for the Free Will Defense (FWD), Plantinga is matchless: “to create creatures capable of moral good . . . [God] must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so” (30). Under the rubric of the FWD, it is logically consistent to hold that the standard Christian beliefs regarding God are not inconsistent with the presence of evil in this present life. However, Plantinga’s distinction between theodicy and defense can be a bit sticky. While Plantinga maintains that the FWD only accomplishes the bare minimum to demonstrate theism as logically consistent, his own efforts in outlining the FWD seem to go beyond the minimum (29). It does not appear that the line between defense and theodicy is as easy to distinguish as he proposes. Regardless, his formulation of the FWD is as clear as it can be and offers a brilliant insight into philosophy for Christians.

His assessment of the teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments is not as thorough as his treatment of the problem of evil. This is in line with his idea of keeping it simple in his book but leaves much to be desired. It is unclear exactly why these three arguments must be treated as wholly separate and thus competing views. His brevity in this regard also fails to consider more developed forms of the teleological and cosmological argument, which is a shortcoming considering his loquacious examination of the ontological argument from Anselm (85-112).⁴ Of course, some of this an issue of time. As Plantinga notes, the ontological argument was experiencing a revival of sorts in intellectual circles during the time of his writing. Since the writing of God, Freedom, and Evil, the cosmological argument has received an infusion of life from the likes of William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. So, much like his references to Spiro Agnew and Watergate, particulars may be worth updating.

1. Jon Cameron, “Biography – Alvin Plantinga,” Gifford Lecture Series 2014, http://www.giffordlectures.org/Author.asp?AuthorID=206.

2. Alvin Plantinga, “Curriculum Vitae,” 2006, http://philosophy.nd.edu/assets/74973/plantingacv6_06.doc.

3. Plantinga does explain that when considering the pastoral problem of evil, no theodicy or defense will truly suffice. This does not negate his efforts in this, but by acknowledging the limits of this exercise, Plantinga limits any accusations of callousness.

4. Compare this section with pp. 76-84 for both other arguments.